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Abstract 
The paper examines the determinants of the assignment of EU funds to Portuguese 
municipalities using a large and unexplored dataset covering all (278) mainland 
municipalities over fifteen years. Empirical results reveal that besides normative 
objectives, the national government also takes into account political motivations in the 
distribution of funds to municipalities. Grants increase during local election years, more 
funds are transferred to municipalities where the government party had higher 
percentages of votes, and where there are more swing voters.  
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1. Introduction 
The main objective of the paper is to analyze the impact of political factors on the 
distribution of European Union (EU) transfers to Portuguese municipalities.1 Portugal joined 
the European Community in 1986, and started receiving European funds through the 
European Regional Policy. Access to European funds had a significant impact on 
Portuguese municipalities. They enlarged local governments’ resources, allowing for an 
improvement of local infra-structure and for an expansion of the scope of municipalities’ 
activities. More attention was given to the organization of territory and to the establishment 
of relationships with foreign entities. EU funds represented between 5% and 12% of 
municipalities’ revenues during the period under analysis (1992 to 2006).  
The Portuguese central government negotiates with the European authorities over 
funding levels and sets the framework for distributing funds across municipalities. Although 
the normative goals of these funds, as suggested by the theory on fiscal federalism,2 are to 
promote efficiency in the production of local public goods and equity among regions, they 
may be subject to political influences that prevent them from fully achieving these 
objectives. The grant giver may distribute more funds in pre electoral years in order to 
increase its chances of re-election, as suggested by the literature on pork barrel politics 
(Ferejohn, 1974) and political business cycles (Rogoff and Sibert, 1988; Rogoff, 1990). It is 
also possible that recipient municipal governments exert more pressure to receive funds 
during local election periods. According to the literature on tactical redistribution, the grant 
giver may target localities with more swing voters in the allocation of funds (Lindbeck and 
                                                 
1
 In mainland Portugal there are only two levels of public administration, the central government and 
municipalities. Only the archipelagos of the Azores and Madeira have the status of autonomous 
regions. 
2
 See Oates (1999) for a survey on fiscal federalism. 
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Weibull, 1987, and 1993) but may favour his supporters if he is risk-averse (Cox and 
McCubbins, 1986). Later on, Dixit and Londregan (1996) developed a model where parties 
favour their core support group when they are more effective in delivering favours to them, 
but woo the group that is most willing to switch their vote in response for economic favours 
if they are equally effective in delivering transfers to any group. Parties may also 
compromise their own ideology, by adjusting their platforms and pork-barrel components of 
policy, to attract swing voters (Dixit and Londregan, 1998).  
Several studies have analyzed the political determinants of the distribution of 
intergovernmental grants but, as far as we know, tests have never been performed using 
data on EU funds. Case (2001) examined the impact of political competition on block grants 
from federal to sub-federal governments in Albania, and found that more assistance was 
allocated to swing communes (local government units) and to those that might be pivotal to 
winning a majority of seats in Parliament. Using data from a temporary program that 
distributed “ecological” grants from the Swedish central government to municipalities, 
Dahlberg and Johansson (2002) reported strong support for the hypothesis that the 
incumbent government (socialist) purchased votes by investing in those municipalities 
where there are a lot of swing voters, but not where it has more supporters. Also for the 
Swedish case, Johansson (2003) reported evidence that municipalities with a high number 
of swing voters receive a higher proportion of intergovernmental grants. On the contrary, 
Ansolabehere and Snyder (2006) analyzing the effects of party control of state government 
on the distribution of intergovernmental transfers across counties in the U.S., found that the 
governing parties skew the distribution of funds in favour of areas that provide them with the 
strongest electoral support, and little or no support for the swing voter model. Hanes (2007) 
using observations for temporary grants in Sweden, over three electoral periods, concluded 
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that under Socialist governments (1985 and 1988) municipalities with a high share of 
Socialist voters were more likely to apply for grants, and to receive them; while this was not 
the case under the 1982 Conservative government. Using Spanish data, Solé-Ollé and 
Sorribas-Navarro (2008) found that partisan alignment has a sizeable positive effect on the 
amount of grants received by municipalities.  
The impact of political factors in the distribution of intergovernmental grants in 
Portugal, as the country matured from a young to an established democracy, was examined 
by Veiga and Pinho (2007).3 Their results indicate that in the early years of democracy 
(1979-1988), grants were allocated tactically across municipalities that is, municipalities 
ruled by mayors that belonged to the Prime Minister’s party, and with more swing voters 
were favoured in the distribution process. Howevere, these phenomena are not visible in the 
established democracy period. Regarding opportunistic effects, they found that increases in 
the amount of grants transferred to municipalities during municipal and legislative election 
years are larger in the second period of the sample (1989-2002), than in the first one. 
The present paper focuses on the political economy of the allocation of EU funds to 
Portuguese municipalities. To our knowledge, this kind of analysis has never been 
performed either for Portugal or any other EU country. The empirical research is 
implemented on an extensive panel covering all mainland municipalities (278), from 1992 to 
2006.4 This rich data set contains information on municipal accounts, demographic and 
socio-economic data regarding the local jurisdictions, and election data for local and central 
                                                 
3
 Also for the Portuguese case but using data for a single year (1989), Pereira (1996) concluded that 
the regressivity of per capita lump-sum intergovernmental grants towards community size is due to the 
structure of the lobbying activities of local governments, and not to hypothetical economies of scale in 
the production of local public goods. 
4
 Municipalities of the autonomous regions of Azores and Madeira were excluded from the analysis 
because they are subject to specific rules concerning EU funds. The status of ultra-peripheral regions 
allows them to have access to more funds than mainland municipalities. 
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governments. Portugal is also an interesting case because access to EU funds allowed for 
a substantial increase of local governments’ financial resources. Furthermore, municipal 
election dates are set exogenously from the perspective of local governments. They occur 
in all municipalities at the same time and, during the period under analysis, they were 
always at the end of the year.  
The paper is organized as follows. The next section presents a discussion of the 
Portuguese institutional structure and section 3 describes the dataset. The empirical 
strategy is explained in section 4 and the empirical results are presented subsequently. 
Finally, conclusions are reported in section 6. 
 
2. Portuguese institutional framework  
There are two levels of sub-national governments in Portugal: the autonomous regions and 
municipalities.5 Regional governments exist only in the archipelagos of Madeira and Azores, 
that is, for mainland Portugal, only the municipal level applies. 
The first local elections after the reestablishment of democracy in 1974 took place in 
December 1976. After 1976 elections were held every three years until 1985 and every four 
years after that. The representative branches of municipal governments are the Town 
Council and the Municipal Assembly. The members of the Town Council are elected directly 
by voters registered in the municipality, who vote for party or independent lists. Following 
the election, the candidate at the top of the list receiving the most votes becomes the 
mayor; he is the president of the Town Council and has a prominent role in executive tasks. 
                                                 
5
 There are 308 municipalities in Portugal, and there is also an infra-municipal level composed of 4259 
counties (freguesias). 
For a description of local governments in Portugal see Silva (2008). 
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There has been a progressive expansion of the activities of municipalities over time. 
During the first years of democracy, local governments were mainly concerned with the 
development of infrastructure, including facilities for sewage and for water and electricity  
distribution. In 1984, Decree-Law 77/84 established a wide variety of responsibilities for 
municipalities in terms of investment. These included sewage, water and energy, 
transportation and communication, education, culture, leisure and sports, and health. After 
joining the European Economic Community in 1986, local governments’ financial resources 
were substantially increased through funds coming from the European Regional Policy. The 
expansion of funds further widened local governments’ concerns to other areas, including 
cultural activities and land use planning. It also promoted the establishment of relationships 
between local governments and foreign entities, namely with the Spanish regions, and 
participation in pan-European associations, such as the Conference of European Peripheral 
Maritime Regions, and especially its Atlantic Arc Commission. By the end of the 1990’s, 
there were new extensions of municipal activities (Law n. 159/99) to promote cultural 
activities, environmental protection, social security, tourism, urban rehabilitation, and 
attraction of private investment. Finally, in 2007, a new local finance law was approved 
expanding municipal responsibilities, particularly in education, health, social services and 
fighting drug addiction. 
Municipalities have budgetary autonomy, but they depend heavily on transfers from 
the national budget and on EU funds. As can be seen in Table 1, the two main sources of 
revenue of local governments are transfers from the central government (participation in 
national tax revenues) and local taxes. The former represents around one third of 
municipalities’ revenues, while the importance of the latter has been increasing over time 
(from 26% in 1992 to 36% in 2006). European Funds for municipalities represented 12% of 
their revenues in 1992 but their relative importance decreased, particularly in the last 
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decade.6 Local governments do not receive funds directly from the European Commission, 
but through a management authority of the program, appointed by the central government. 
It is up to the national government to negotiate with the European authorities the amount of 
funds to be allocated to the country, through the submission of development plans. 
<Table 1> 
European funds for Portugal have primarily been allocated through various phases 
of the Community Support Framework (CSF). The first CSF was set for the 1989-93 period, 
the second for 1994-99, the third for 2000-06, and the current one for 2007-13. These have 
been developed under the European Regional Policy, whose objective is to reduce 
asymmetries among European Union’s regions, in order to increase social and economic 
cohesion within its borders.7 Instrumental for this purpose are the transfers to national and 
sub-national levels, particularly the Cohesion Fund and the Structural Funds. They account 
for about one third of the overall budget of the European Union and have, for the period 
under analysis, three main objectives. Objective 1 is to promote the development and 
structural adjustment of regions whose development is lagging behind, more specifically, 
those whose gross domestic product is below 75% of the Community average. Objective 2 
aims to revitalise all areas facing structural difficulties, whether industrial, rural, urban or 
dependent on fisheries. Objective 3 is to support the adaptation and modernization of 
education, training and employment policies and systems in regions not eligible under 
objective 1. The four structural funds are the European Regional Development Fund, the 
European Social Fund, the European Agricultural Guidance and Guarantee Fund, and the 
Financial Instrument for Fisheries Guidance. There are also specific European Union 
                                                 
6
 European funds only appear in a separate item of municipal accounts from 1992 onwards. 
Previously, they were reported in the item Other transfers. 
7
 The European Union currently comprises 27 countries, encompassing 271 NUTS II regions. 
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programs, called community initiatives, which seek joint solutions for particular problems, 
usually in regions eligible for economic and social cohesion objectives. During the period 
under analysis, all Portuguese regions were eligible under objective 1, funded by the four 
structural funds8 and the cohesion fund. 
The selection of projects to be financed with European funds is made by national 
and regional authorities that are led by members of government or appointed by it. The 
organizational model for the assessment and monitoring of all CSF operational programs 
was first defined by Decree-Law 121-B/90, and amended several times over the years. All 
the information was finally revised and assembled by Decree-Law 54-A/2000 that defines 
the organic structure for the management, follow up, evaluation and control of CSF III and 
EU structural interventions for Portugal. 
 Because there are no regional governments in Portugal, central authorities decide 
over the distribution of funds to municipalities. Despite politically neutral official program 
goals, political influences may distort the decision process.9 Rent-seeking activities, 
particularly with re-election purposes, may appear both at the central and local levels. When 
negotiating with the European authorities, the National Government may try to obtain a 
higher quota of the funds, not only to promote regional development, but also to use as a 
political tool. Local authorities may lobby the central government to extract more funds,10 
especially in local election years, in order to signal competence to their constituents.   
 
3. The dataset  
                                                 
8
 The Lisbon region received only transitional support in 2000-2006, given that it was no longer eligible 
to receive objective 1 funds. 
9
 See Ruivo (2004) for anecdotal evidence. 
10
 The National Association of Municipalities, for example, is an organization created as a pressure 
group for supporting municipalities’ interests. 
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The dataset used in the paper covers all municipalities in mainland Portugal (278), from 
1992 to 2006. It contains information on municipal accounts, demography, socio-economic 
characteristics and elections for local and national governments. Table 2 reports descriptive 
statistics of the variables used in the empirical work. 
<Table 2> 
Data on municipal accounts were obtained from the Direcção Geral das Autoridades Locais 
(the General Management of Municipalities) annual publication called Finanças Municipais 
(Municipal Finances), and demographic data from the Portuguese Institute of Statistics 
(Census and Regional Statistical Yearbooks). The amount of national taxes and personal 
income taxes (IRS) collected in each municipality was obtained from the Marktest’s Sales 
Index database. GDP per capita for the NUTS 3 (Nomenclature of Territorial Units for 
Statistics) regions was extracted from the Eurostat’s webpage, and the consumer price 
index from the IMF’s International Financial Statistics. The source of political data is the 
National Electoral Commission and the Technical Staff for Matters Concerning the Electoral 
Process (STAPE), of the Internal Affairs Ministry.   
 
4. Empirical strategy 
 Our dependent variable is real EU funds per capita received by municipality i in year 
t (EU_Fundsit). It is measured in real terms, to control for price increases over time, and 
defined per capita in order to take into account size differences among municipalities. 
Several political variables characterizing central and local governments, as well as 
demographic, economic, and social indicators of the municipalities are used as explanatory 
variables. Lagged values of the dependent variable are included to take into account the 
autoregressive component of the series. Since the period under analysis (1992-2006) 
covers several Community Support Frameworks (CSF), a dummy variable for the CSF III 
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(2000-06) was included to capture specific features of this framework. Subsequent 
regressions will also be estimated separating the sample for observations within the CSF II 
(1994-99) and the CSF III. A time trend (Trend) is used to control for time-effects that may 
affect the distribution of EU funds equally across all municipalities. 
The following variables are included to test for political influences on the distribution 
of EU funds to municipalities: 
- Legislative Electionit is a dummy variable equal to one in legislative election years, and 
zero otherwise. This variable tests for pork barrel policies using grants. In order to woo the 
electorate, the central government may increase grants transferred to municipalities. Thus, 
a positive coefficient is expected. 
- Local Election Yeari,t is a dummy variable that takes the value of one in municipal election 
years, and zero otherwise. It tests for increases in EU grants during municipal election 
years. Veiga and Veiga (2007) have found that, in pre-electoral periods, Portuguese mayors 
increase expenditures, particularly on items that are highly visible to the electorate, in order 
to enhance their chances of re-election.11 If local politicians pressure the central government 
to obtain more funds to woo the electorate, the coefficient associated with this variable 
should be positive.  
- Years mayor in officeit is the number of years a mayor has been in office.12 It tests the 
hypothesis that mayors who stay in office longer have better knowledge of the distribution 
process and are, therefore, more able to extract funds from the distributing agency. A 
positive coefficient is expected. 
- Same Partyit is a dummy variable that takes the value one when the mayor and the prime-
minister belong to the same political party. Since this variable tests the Cox and 
                                                 
11
 Baleiras and Costa (2004) also find evidence of political business cycles for Portuguese 
municipalities. 
12
 There were no term limits during the period under analysis.  
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McCubbins’s (1986) hypothesis that the grant giver favours his supporters in the allocation 
of funds, a positive coefficient is expected. 
- Gov % Votes Previous Electionit measures the percentage of votes received in the 
municipality by the party in the central government in the previous legislative election. Under 
the Cox and McCubbins’s (1986) hypothesis, a positive coefficient is also expected for the 
coefficient associated with this variable. 
- Abs Dif Votes Previous Electionit is the absolute value of the difference in vote shares in 
each municipality between the main party in the central government and its main opponent, 
in the last legislative election. This variable is used as a proxy for the number of swing 
voters;13 it allows us to test whether the distribution agency targets or not municipalities with 
many undecided voters (Lindbeck and Weibull, 1987; and Dixit and Londregan, 1998). A 
negative coefficient would be consistent with this hypothesis. 
 In order to take local population’s needs and the wealth of the municipality into 
account, several variables described below were also considered. They are all lagged one 
year, because data are not immediately reported and available to policymakers. 
 - Populationit-1 represents the number of inhabitants in a municipality, in thousands, in the 
previous year. If there are economies of scale in the provision of local public goods, per 
capita grants are expected to decrease with communities’ size (a negative coefficient). 
- Illiteracy rateit-1 is the percentage of illiterates in the municipality’s population, in the 
previous year. This is a proxy for the municipality’s level of development. Given that a major 
objective of EU funds is to reduce disparities among regions, a positive sign is expected for 
the coefficient associated with this variable. 
                                                 
13
 No survey election data covering all municipalities and the whole period analyzed is available for 
Portugal. 
 11
- National_taxesit-1 is the national taxes per capita collected in the municipality, in the 
previous year. This variable is a proxy for the municipality’s wealth, and therefore, a 
negative sign is expected for the coefficient associated with it, if grants are distributed to 
reduce disparities. However, since projects funded by the EU require co-funding with local 
resources, a positive sign is also plausible for the coefficient associated with this variable.  
 The empirical model can be described by the following equation: 
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where, yit is the dependent variable, p is the number of lags of the dependent variable, ' ,tiX  
is a vector of explanatory variables, α and β are vectors of parameters to estimate, νi  is the 
individual effect of municipality i, and εi,t is the error term. 
 The model could be estimated using the Ordinary Least Squares method, assuming 
the municipal specific effects as fixed or random. However, in a linear dynamic panel model, 
when the sample shows a clear dominance of the number of individuals over time periods, 
this procedure generates inconsistent estimates of the model’s parameters, given that the 
lagged value of the dependent variable is correlated with the error term. This is the case of 
the panel dataset under analysis, which includes 278 municipalities and 15 years of 
observations. Arellano and Bond (1991) have developed a Generalized Method of Moments 
(GMM) estimator to overcome the problems mentioned above. Since there is persistence in 
the series, the extended version of the GMM estimator for dynamic datasets proposed by 
Blundell and Bond (1998), the system-GMM estimator, will be used in the empirical work. 
 
5. Empirical Results 
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Estimation results for the model described in the previous section, using the system-GMM 
method for linear dynamic panel data models,14 are shown in Table 3. T-statistics are 
presented between parentheses and the degree of statistical significance is signalled with 
asterisks. The number of observations and municipalities, the results of the autocorrelation 
tests, and the p-value of the Hansen test for the validity of the over-identifying restrictions 
are reported at the bottom of the table. 
<Table 3> 
Column 1 presents the results for the baseline model. The first lag of the dependent 
variable is statistically significant, suggesting that there is persistence in the amount of EU 
funds received by municipalities.15 The estimated coefficient associated with the trend 
variable is statistically significant and positive, indicating that there has been an annual 
increase of EU grants of approximately 0.85 Euros per capita. The dummy for the third 
Community Support Framework is highly statistically significant, revealing that grants 
received during CSFIII were significantly higher than in the previous frameworks. As 
anticipated, there is a negative relationship between grants per capita and the number of 
inhabitants, suggesting that grants are distributed under the hypothesis of the existence of 
economies of scale in the production of local public goods. The coefficient associated with 
the illiteracy rate is highly statistically significant and positive, suggesting that more grants 
are attributed to less socially developed communities. The amount of taxes collected in the 
municipality, used to proxy municipal income does not seem to influence the allocation 
process.  
Regarding political influences in the amount of grants transferred, there is clear 
evidence of a significant increase (around 19 Euros per capita) during local election years, 
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 The two-step results, using robust standard errors corrected for finite samples, are presented. 
15
 The choice of the number of lags to include was based on their statistical significance and on the 
need to avoid second order autocorrelation of the residuals.  
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an increase of 51% relative to the sample mean (38.08 Euros). Furthermore, the 
percentage of votes received in the municipality by the parties in central government is 
statistically significant, suggesting that the government favours its supporters. The results 
show no evidence that funding is higher in legislative election years. This is not surprising 
given that during the period under analysis two of the four elections took place at the 
beginning of the year (March 2002 and February 2005), and well before elections would 
have been mandated.16 Funding does not depend on the years of experience of the mayor, 
or on party similarity of the mayor and the prime minister. The variable used to proxy swing 
voters (Abs Dif Votes Previous Election), although negatively signed as expected, is not 
statistically significant.  
In order to take into account that incumbent governments did not complete their 
terms before the 2002 and 2005 elections, the dummy variable Legislative Election Year 
was replaced in column 2 by the dummy Legislative Election Year (1995 & 1999), which 
only takes the value of one in 1995 and 1999. Since the latter dummy is highly statistically 
significant, there is clear evidence of opportunistic manipulation of grants in the legislative 
election years of 1995 and 1999. The remaining results reported in column 2 are very 
similar to those of column 1. The exception is that the variable used to proxy the number of 
indecisive voters in the municipality (Abs Dif Votes Previous Election) is now marginally 
statistically significant, suggesting that municipalities received more grants when the party in 
office had won by a narrower margin in the prceding election. 
In column 3, the dummy variable for the local election years was interacted with the 
dummies that, respectively, indicate party similarity and absence of party similarity between 
the mayor and the Prime-Minister. This modification of the model permits a test of the 
                                                 
16
 The 2002 election was precipited by the resignation of government on December 2001, due to the 
poor results obtained by the ruling Socialist party in the municipal elections. The 2005 election 
resulted from the dismissal of the government by the President of the Republic. 
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hypothesis that mayors belonging to the prime-minister’s party are favoured in local election 
years. Both estimated coefficients are positive, and statistically significant, but a Wald test 
does not allow the rejection of the hypothesis that they are equal. The same interaction was 
formed with the dummy for the 1995 and 1999 legislative election years, in column 4. Again, 
a Wald test does not allow the rejection of the hypothesis that the coefficients estimated for 
the interactions are equal.  
The estimations whose results are reported in Table 4 include other variables that 
proxy municipal wealth, besides the per capita amount of national taxes collected in the 
municipality, and exclude two variables that were not statistically significant in the 
estimations of Table 3: Years Mayor in Office and Same Party.17 Column 1 reports the 
results of the estimation of the models of column 2 of Table 3 when the two variables 
referred to above are excluded. In column 2, National Taxes was replaced by the real per 
capita Personal Income Taxes collected in the municipality,18 which turned out to be 
statistically significant, and positively signed. This result suggests that more grants are 
attributed to wealthier municipalities and, therefore, that grants do not primarily target the 
reduction of economic disparities among municipalities. An explanation for this result is that 
wealthier and more dynamic municipalities apply more for funds, and have more resources 
available to co-fund the EU supported projects. To better test this hypothesis, we added to 
the model (see column 3) the two main sources of revenues for municipalities: the real per 
capita amount of unconditional grants received in the previous year (Transfers_Unc_Govit-
1), and the real per capita amount of local taxes collected in the previous year (Municipal 
Taxesit-1). Results indicate that there is a positive relationship between transfers received 
through participation in national taxes and EU funds, confirming that municipalities with 
                                                 
17
 These variables are never statistically significant when included in the estimations of Table 4. 
Furthermore, Wald tests allow for their exclusion. 
18
 The correlation between this variable and total taxes is 0.7. 
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more resources available for co-funding receive more EU funds. In fact, if we exclude 
Personal Income Taxes it-1 from the regression (column 4), Municipal Taxes also shows up 
as statistically significant, reinforcing this conclusion. 
<Table 4> 
It is possible that these results are driven by the Lisbon region, the wealthiest and 
most dynamic of the Portuguese regions. In order to account for this possibility, we 
excluded the municipalities of the Lisbon and Tagus Valley region from the sample in the 
estimations of columns 5 and 6. Since the results obtained are essentially the same as 
those reported in columns 2 and 4 (for the entire sample), results do not seem to be driven 
by the Lisbon and Tagus Valley region. 
The next step of the empirical analysis was to estimate the model of column 4 of 
Table 4 for each of the five NUTS II regions of continental Portugal. The results are 
presented in Table 5. Consistent with the results shown in previous tables, there is clear 
evidence of an increase in grant transfers in local election years. The only exception is the 
Algarve region, for which the coefficient of the dummy for the local election year is not 
statistically significant. But, it should be noted that the estimation for Algarve has a much 
smaller number of observations than those for the other regions, which also helps explain 
why only the lagged dependent variable is statistically significant. The evidence for 
increases in transfers in legislative election years is weaker, as the dummy for the 1995 and 
1999 elections is only statistically significant for the regions of Centre and Lisbon and Tagus 
Valley. Furthermore, there is only evidence that governments favour their supporters and 
target swing voters for municipalities belonging to the Alentejo’s region. Regarding the 
normative determinants of EU funds, unconditional transfers received by municipalities 
seem to exert a positive influence in the North, Centre, and Lisbon and Tagus valley 
regions. 
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<Table 5> 
The last empirical exercise performed, which is reported in Table 6, was to estimate 
the same model for the different Community Support Frameworks (CSF). This was also a 
way of checking whether or not results change across time. Column 1 reports the results 
obtained when the sample is restricted to the first two CSFs. In fact, since data on transfers 
of EU funds start only in 1992, the sample used in the estimation of column 1 covers the 
period 1992-1999. The results clearly show that grant transfers to municipalities increase in 
local election years, and there is also support for the hypothesis that governments target 
both the municipalities where they have largest support and where there are more swing 
voters. Finally, there is no evidence that transfers increase in legislative election years. 
Virtually identical results are obtained when the sample is restricted to the period under CSF 
II, 1994-1999 (see column 2). 
<Table 6> 
 The results obtained for CSF III (2000-2006) are reported in column 3. Again, they 
are supportive of the hypothesis that grant transfers increase in local election years. In fact, 
the estimated coefficient is much larger than in columns 1 and 2, indicating that the 
opportunistic manipulation of grant transfers was larger in the period 2000-2006 than in 
previous years.19 The results concerning legislative elections are exactly the opposite, as 
the estimated coefficient for Legislative Election Year is negative and statistically significant. 
This means that transfers of EU funds to municipalities where smaller in the election years 
of 2002 and 2005 than in the non-election years of the period covered by the CSF III. As 
mentioned above, these years’ legislative elections happened in the beginning of the year 
(February and March) and after the fall of the respective governments prior to the end of 
                                                 
19
 This result is consistent with the findings of Veiga and Pinho (2007), who show that the 
opportunistic manipulation of total grants transferred to Portuguese municipalities is greater in the 
later years of their sample.  
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their terms. Since the premature ends of the mandates were not anticipated, there was no 
room for opportunistic manipulation of EU funds transferred to municipalities. 
 The results for this period (2000-2006) also indicate that governments targeted the 
municipalities where they enjoyed larger support,20 but did not target municipalities with 
more swing voters. 
 
6. Conclusions 
The entrance of Portugal to the European Community in 1986 allowed local governments to 
benefit from EU funds. These transfers significantly increased their revenues, contributing 
to an expansion of their areas of intervention and to an improvement of local comunnnities 
welfare. This paper intends to unveil the impact of political factors in the allocation of 
European Union funds to Portuguese local governments, on a panel covering all mainland 
municipalities over 15 years. Econometric results reveal that the amount of EU funds per 
capita transferred to local governments increases significantly during local balloting years, 
suggesting that local governments’ lobbying efforts to have more resources for electoral 
purposes are satisfied by the grant giver. Furthermore, funds also seem to be used 
strategically by the central government to win elections. There is evidence of grant 
increases for the two legislative election years (1995 and 1999) prior to which the incumbent 
governments stayed in office during their entire terms, and that the distribution is skewed 
towards municipalities with more swing voters and where the parties in central government 
have a stronger political support. 
 These results corroborate Veiga and Pinho’s (2007) conclusion that, even when 
democracy was well established in the country, opportunistic effects in the distribution of 
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 It is worth noting that, although the estimated coefficient for Gov %Votes Previous Election is larger 
than in the previous columns, it is only marginally statistically significant. 
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general intergovernmental transfers in Portugal were strong, particularly during periods of 
political stability when incumbents could plan and implement electoral policies. However, 
they contradict Veiga and Pinho’s (2007) finding that tactical manipulation of general grants 
is only present during the early years of democracy (1979-88). For European Union funds, 
there is evidence of tactical redistribution over the entire period covered in the paper (1992 
to 2006), although for the third Community Support Framework results are weaker. Given 
the importance of European Union funds to local governments and the normative objectives 
that underly their attribution to the country, more transparency in the distribution process 
would be desirable. Research for other countries would also be desirable in oder to 
determine if this is a commum feature.  
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Table 1. Main sources of municipalities’ revenue 
 
Year Tax 
Revenue 
Rates, property 
revenue, sales of 
goods and services 
Participation 
in national tax 
revenues 
EU funds Other 
transfers 
Financial 
liabilities 
Other 
revenue 
Total revenue 
    106 € % 106 € % 106 € % 106 € % 106 € % 106 € % 106 € % 106 € % 
1991 580,0 26 325,2 15 787,2 35 
  
381,8 17 118,2 5 43,9 2 2236,3 100 
1992 693,3 26 417,9 16 895,1 33 310,6 12 142,1 5 151,3 6 64,0 2 2674,4 100 
1993 733,0 26 433,1 15 967,4 34 289,9 10 183,0 6 193,4 7 46,7 2 2846,6 100 
1994 776,1 27 448,4 16 988,1 34 245,9 9 155,6 5 216,0 8 46,4 2 2876,6 100 
1995 909,5 29 494,5 16 1089,6 35 236,3 8 154,3 5 146,5 5 72,5 2 3103,2 100 
1996 987,3 28 546,4 16 1211,9 34 327,8 9 147,2 4 178,2 5 120,7 3 3519,5 100 
1997 1090,3 26 635,5 15 1262,8 30 410,9 10 218,9 5 342,9 8 201,8 5 4162,9 100 
1998 1335,1 29 627,3 14 1353,7 30 394,9 9 233,0 5 427,3 9 167,5 4 4538,6 100 
1999 1613,6 32 740,1 14 1494,6 29 419,9 8 332,5 6 380,2 7 139,1 3 5120,0 100 
2000 1725,7 32 752,2 14 1636,9 30 308,1 6 330,8 6 470,5 9 150,9 3 5375,1 100 
2001 1805,9 28 817,7 13 1858,4 29 547,9 8 324,0 5 804,5 12 304,0 5 6462,3 100 
2002 1945,0 28 799,2 11 2074,0 30 497,4 7 442,4 6 1089,9 16 131,8 2 6979,9 100 
2003 2033,9 31 740,4 11 2359,5 36 470,3 7 178,1 3 526,0 8 202,4 3 6510,6 100 
2004 2253,4 33 776,2 11 2469,2 36 373,0 5 233,9 3 418,6 6 266,7 4 6791,0 100 
2005 2402,0 34 927,6 13 2544,0 36 382,7 5 239,5 3 345,0 5 317,5 4 7158,3 100 
2006 2482,7 36 866,2 12 2565,3 37 341,2 5 168,7 2 278,0 4 279,9 4 6982,0 100 
          
Source: D.G.A.L. (1991-2006), Finanças Municipais. 
Note: Before 1992, EU funds were included in Other Transfers. 
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Table 2: Descriptive Statistics 
 
Variables N.Obs. Average Standard 
Deviation 
Minimum Maximum 
      
EUTransfers 4150 38.08 61.96 0 814.65 
      
Political variables: 
     
Legislative Election Year 4146 .27 .44 0 1 
Local Election Year 4146 .27 .44 0 1 
Same Party 4149 .41 .49 0 1 
Years Mayor in Office 4140 8.19 6.02 1 30 
Gov % Votes Previous Election 4140 47.00 12.81 12.91 83.80 
Abs. Difference Votes Previous 
Election 
4140 22.25 15.59 .02 76.71 
      
Control Variables: 
     
Trend 4170 8 4.32 1 15 
CSFIII 4170 .47 .50 0 1 
Population in thousand 4150 35.10 57.41 1.77 648.26 
Illiteracy rate 4150 14.19 5.90 3.68 36.83 
National taxes 4149 78.65 78.78 7.10 735.70 
Unconditional Transfers 4150 299.40 209.75 0 1475.14 
Municipal Taxes 4148 359.75 521.86 10.32 9509.42 
Personal Income Taxes 4150 121.59 140.75 0 2135.78 
      
Sources: DGAL, INE, STAPE, EUROSTAT, and IMF. 
Note: The EU transfers, GDP, and taxes are always expressed in Euros per capita (at 
2000 prices). 
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Table 3: EU transfers to Municipalities (GMM) 
     
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
     EU Transf (-1) .45 
(16.19)*** 
.46 
(16.45)*** 
.46 
(16.87)*** 
.46 
(16.80)*** 
Trend .85 
(2.27)** 
.60 
(1.66)* 
.62 
(1.72)* 
.63 
(1.79)* 
CSF III  28.19 
(7.17)*** 
32.40 
(8.75)*** 
33.02 
(9.65)*** 
32.48 
(9.43)*** 
Population(-1) -.06 
(-3.18)*** 
-.06 
(-2.93)*** 
-.06 
(-2.95)*** 
-.06 
(-3.04)*** 
Illiteracy rate(-1) 
 
1.44 
(6.20)*** 
1.44 
(5.91)*** 
1.48 
(7.26)*** 
1.48 
(7.30)*** 
National_taxes (-1) .001 
(.59) 
.001 
(.53) 
.001 
(.50) 
.001 
(.41) 
     
Legislative Election Year .40 
(.20) 
   
Legislative Election Year (1995 & 1999)  
 
7.63 
(6.40)*** 
7.84 
(6.52)*** 
 
Local Election Year 19.53 
(9.89)*** 
20.82 
(10.02)*** 
 20.85 
(10.57)***          
Years Mayor in Office -.13 
(-.97) 
-.14 
(-1.04) 
  
Same Party 2.44 
(1.06) 
2.44 
(1.07) 
  
Gov %Votes Previous election .24 
(2.01)** 
.22 
(2.17)** 
.25 
(2.41)** 
.25 
(2.58)** 
Abs Dif Votes Previous Election -.16 
(-1.62) 
-.13 
(-1.65)* 
-.13 
(-1.60) 
-.14 
(-1.78) 
Local El. Year*Same Party   20.06 
(6.56)*** 
 
Local El. Year*Diff. Party   21.67 
(7.31)*** 
 
Leg.El.Year(1995&1999) * Same Party    8.72 
(5.39)*** 
Leg.El.Year(1995&1999) * Diff. Party    6.86 
(5.38)*** 
     m1 -6.63*** -6.63*** -6.65*** -6.63*** 
m2 .36 .90 .91 .91 
Hansen Test (p-value) .95 .92 .88 .92 
No. Observations 3853 3853 3853 3853 
No. Municipalities 278 278 278 278 
     
Sources: DGAL, STAPE, OECD and INE. 
Notes: - T-statistics are between parentheses. Significance level for which the null hypothesis is 
rejected: **, 1%, and *, 5%. 
- Two-step results using robust standard errors corrected for finite samples for estimations of 
system-GMM linear models for panel data (which combine the equations in first-differences 
with the equations in levels). 
- m1 and m2 are tests for first-order and second-order serial correlation in the first-differenced 
residuals, asymptotically distributed as N(0,1) under the null of no serial correlation. Hansen is 
a test for the validity of the over-identifying restrictions for the GMM estimators, asymptotically 
χ2. P-value is reported. 
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Table 4: EU transfers to Municipalities – Additional Results 
       
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 All municipalities Without the Lisbon 
and Tagus Valley 
region 
       
       EU Transf (-1) .46 
(16.90)*** 
.45 
(16.69)*** 
.37 
(13.91)*** 
.37 
(13.77)*** 
.46 
(14.98)*** 
.38 
(12.43)*** 
Trend .62 
(1.80)* 
.72 
(2.15)** 
-.90 
(-2.16)** 
-.93 
(-2.25)** 
.85 
(2.28)** 
-.89 
(-1.90)* 
CSF III  33.10 
(9.44)*** 
32.13 
(9.81)*** 
32.41 
(9.92)*** 
32.83 
(9.58)*** 
31.77 
(8.72)*** 
33.87 
(9.08)*** 
Population(-1) -.06 
(-2.96)*** 
-.08 
(-3.74)*** 
-.05 
(-4.27)*** 
-.05 
(-3.96)*** 
-.11 
(-4.38)*** 
-.06 
(-3.14)*** 
Illiteracy rate(-1) 1.45 
(6.89)*** 
1.49 
(7.86)*** 
-.36 
(-1.30) 
-.35 
(-1.18) 
1.46 
(6.50)*** 
-.24 
(-.83) 
National Taxes (-1)  .001 
(.42) 
     
Personal Income Taxes (-1)   .01 
(2.24)** 
.005 
(1.04) 
 .02 
(1.81)* 
 
Transfers_Unc_Gov (-1)    .09 
(7.43)*** 
.09 
(6.96)*** 
  .08 
(6.37)*** 
Municipal Taxes (-1)   .02 
(1.67)* 
.02 
(2.04)** 
 .03 
(2.26)** 
       
Legislative Election Year (1995 
& 1999) 
7.50 
(6.34)*** 
7.52 
(6.43)*** 
7.43 
(6.55)*** 
7.52 
(6.39)*** 
6.73 
(5.67)*** 
6.78 
(5.69)*** 
Local Election Year  20.61 
(10.79)*** 
20.62 
(10.35)*** 
19.66 
(10.08)*** 
19.73 
(9.94)*** 
20.55 
(11.22)*** 
20.41 
(10.40)*** 
Gov %Votes Previous election .24 
(2.39)** 
.29 
(2.82)*** 
.29 
(2.69)*** 
.28 
(2.73)*** 
.27 
(2.33)*** 
.25 
(2.20)*** 
Abs Dif Votes Previous 
Election 
-.13 
(-1.75)* 
-.15 
(-1.99)** 
-.17 
(-2.14)** 
-.16 
(-2.25)*** 
-.14 
(-1.54) 
-.13 
(-1.79)* 
       m1 -6.62*** -6.62*** -6.61*** -6.59*** -6.35*** -6.33*** 
m2 .90 .89 .37 .38 1.20 .77 
Hansen Test (p-value) .94 .91 .88 .85 .98 .90 
No. Observations 3853 3853 3865 3853 3152 3152 
No. Municipalities 278 278 278 278 227 227 
       
Sources: DGAL, STAPE, OECD and INE. 
Notes: - T-statistics are between parentheses. Significance level for which the null hypothesis is 
rejected: **, 1%, and *, 5%. 
- Two-step results using robust standard errors corrected for finite samples for estimations of 
system-GMM linear models for panel data (which combine the equations in first-differences 
with the equations in levels). 
- m1 and m2 are tests for first-order and second-order serial correlation in the first-differenced 
residuals, asymptotically distributed as N(0,1) under the null of no serial correlation. Hansen is 
a test for the validity of the over-identifying restrictions for the GMM estimators, asymptotically 
χ2. P-value is reported. 
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Table 5: Results for the NUTS II Regions 
      
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
      
 North Centre Lisbon and 
Tagus valley 
Alentejo Algarve 
      
      EU Transf (-1) .36 
(7.82)*** 
.70 
(5.24)*** 
.27 
(5.77)*** 
.31 
(5.02)*** 
.31 
(2.15)** 
EU Transf (-2)  .02 
(.23) 
   
Trend -.70 
(-1.14) 
-2.954 
(-5.98)*** 
-.48 
(-.90) 
2.85 
(2.38)** 
1.71 
(.06) 
CSF III  17.88 
(3.28)*** 
28.87 
(5.68)*** 
25.68 
(2.95)*** 
33.34 
(4.47)*** 
-200.3 
(-.41) 
Population(-1) -.04 
(-1.57) 
.04 
(1.45) 
-.01 
(-.68) 
-.37 
(-1.35) 
-2.02 
(-.51) 
Illiteracy rate(-1) .42 
(.95) 
-.63 
(-1.82)* 
-.84 
(-1.54) 
.24 
(.22) 
-17.15 
(-.35) 
Transfers_Unc_Gov (-1) .07 
(4.21)*** 
.07 
(3.18)*** 
.161 
(3.45)*** 
.03 
(1.51) 
.36 
(.44) 
Municipal Taxes (-1) .03 
(1.07) 
-.02 
(-.61) 
-.04 
(-.93) 
-.12 
(-1.22) 
-.11 
(-.61) 
      
Legislative Election Year (1995 
& 1999) 
1.60 
(.70) 
7.36 
(3.45)*** 
8.35 
(3.27)*** 
3.83 
(1.12) 
-575.5 
(-.36) 
Local Election Year 19.14 
(6.73)*** 
22.24 
(6.57)*** 
14.75 
(2.74)*** 
25.37 
(4.69)*** 
36.41 
(.99) 
Gov %Votes Previous election -.19 
(-.93) 
.001 
(.006) 
.48 
(1.45) 
1.05 
(3.62)*** 
2.10 
(.59) 
Abs Dif Votes Previous 
Election 
-.20 
(-1.11) 
-.07 
(-.79) 
-.28 
(-1.20) 
-.47 
(-
1.36)*** 
2.34 
(1.00) 
      m1 -4.20*** -3.63*** -2.33*** -2.99*** -.39 
m2 .03 1.66 -.97 -.18 -.12 
Hansen Test (p-value) .99 .99 .99 .99 .99 
No. Observations 1178 1014 701 658 224 
No. Municipalities 86 78 51 47 16 
      
Sources: DGAL, STAPE, OECD and INE. 
Notes: - T-statistics are between parentheses. Significance level for which the null hypothesis is 
rejected: **, 1%, and *, 5%. 
- Two-step results using robust standard errors corrected for finite samples for estimations of 
system-GMM linear models for panel data (which combine the equations in first-differences 
with the equations in levels). 
- m1 and m2 are tests for first-order and second-order serial correlation in the first-differenced 
residuals, asymptotically distributed as N(0,1) under the null of no serial correlation. Hansen is 
a test for the validity of the over-identifying restrictions for the GMM estimators, asymptotically 
χ2. P-value is reported. 
Tabela formatada
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Table 6: Results for the Community Support Frameworks 
    
 (1) (2) (3) 
    
 CSF I & II CSF II CSF III 
 1992-1999 1994-1999 2000-2006 
    
    EU Transf (-1) .60 
(13.10)*** 
.58 
(10.80)*** 
.41 
(14.29)*** 
Trend .39 
(3.20)*** 
.39 
(3.57)*** 
-1.75 
(-2.50)** 
Population(-1) -.01 
(-1.37) 
-.01 
(-4.02)*** 
-.07 
(-2.68)*** 
Illiteracy rate(-1) .09 
(1.00) 
.08 
(1.01) 
.02 
(.02) 
Transfers_Unc_Gov (-1) .02 
(3.66)*** 
.01 
(2.75)*** 
.09 
(5.69)*** 
Municipal Taxes (-1) .01 
(1.49) 
.01 
(1.07) 
.03 
(1.26) 
    
Legislative Election Year -.05 
(-.08) 
.06 
(.09) 
-13.52 
(-3.99)*** 
Local Election Year 2.53 
(3.47)*** 
2.98 
(3.53)*** 
40.79 
(9.56)*** 
Gov %Votes Previous election .19 
(4.46)*** 
.16 
(2.97)*** 
.37 
(1.92)* 
Abs Dif Votes Previous Election -.15 
(-4.11)*** 
-.13 
(-2.69)*** 
-.004 
(-.04) 
    m1 -5.53*** -5.43*** -6.19*** 
m2 .26 .26 .34 
Hansen Test (p-value) .76 .79 .83 
No. Observations 1925 1650 1928 
No. Municipalities 275 275 278 
    
Sources: DGAL, STAPE, OECD and INE. 
Notes: - T-statistics are between parentheses. Significance level for which the null hypothesis is 
rejected: **, 1%, and *, 5%. 
- Two-step results using robust standard errors corrected for finite samples for estimations of 
system-GMM linear models for panel data (which combine the equations in first-differences 
with the equations in levels). 
- m1 and m2 are tests for first-order and second-order serial correlation in the first-differenced 
residuals, asymptotically distributed as N(0,1) under the null of no serial correlation. Hansen is 
a test for the validity of the over-identifying restrictions for the GMM estimators, asymptotically 
χ2. P-value is reported. 
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